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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 990076-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 2

KELLY LAXTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for Distribution of a Controlled
Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8( 1 )(a)(ii) (Supp.
1998). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue on Appeal. Did the trial court act within its discretion when it sentenced
defendant to three indeterminate prison terms of one-to-fifteen years, to be served
consecutively, for his conviction on three counts of distribution of a controlled substance?
Standard of Review. Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely
within the discretion of the court." State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Utah 1984); see
also State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997). Accordingly, the appellate
court will not overturn a trial court's sentencing decision unless it finds an abuse of
1

discretion. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651; State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App.
1997). An abuse of discretion may be found if the sentencing is inherently unfair, is clearly
excessive, or is imposed without considering all legally relevant factors. Schweitzer, 943
P.2d at 651. Nevertheless, the court "may find an abuse of discretion only if [it] concludefs]
that 'no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (quoting
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
The interpretation of the following statute is determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1998):
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
* * *

(4) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
* * *

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Defendant was charged by separate informations with three counts of distribution of
a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
2

Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)(Supp. 1998). 181R.4; 182R. 1; 183R. I.1 Following a preliminary
hearing on all three charges, defendant was bound over for trial. 181R. 16; 182R. 16; 183R.
16. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to three reduced counts of
distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony. 181R. 20-27,36-37. The trial
court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen years on each of the
offenses. 181R. 36-38. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. 181R. 39.
SUMMARY OF FACTS2

In August 1998, a detective from the Moab Police Department made arrangements for
two confidential informants to purchase methamphetamine from defendant. 181R. 1; 182R.
2; 183R. 2. Over the course offivedays, the confidential informants made three controlled
purchases of methamphetamine from defendant. In the first of these controlled buys, the
confidential informants purchased from defendant .50 grams of methamphetamine for
$40.00. 182R. 2-3; PSI at 2. In the second controlled buy, they purchased from defendant
l

The record on appeal includes the individual files for each of the three separate
cases filed under Case Nos. 9817-181, 9817-182, and 9817-183 respectively.
Accordingly, citation to the record will identify the record by the last three digits of the
respective case number, e.g., 181R., 182R., and 183R.
2

Although a preliminary hearing was held prior to defendant's plea to reduced
charges, a transcript of the hearing was not made part of the record on appeal, nor was a
transcript of the change of plea hearing made a part of the record. Accordingly, the facts
cited herein are primarily taken from the probable cause statements supporting
defendant's arrest warrants and the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI), a copy of
which is attached in Addendum A. Both the transcript of the sentencing hearing and the
PSI are identified at page 47 of the record. Accordingly, citation to the presentence report
will be "PSI" followed by the page number, e.g., PSI at 3. Citation to the transcript, a
copy of which is found in Addendum B, will be TOS followed by the page number, e.g.,
TOSatlO.
3

another .50 grams of methamphetamine for $50.00. 183R. 2-3; PSI at 2. In the third
controlled buy, the confidential informants purchased from defendant 1.75 grams of
methamphetamine for $120.00. 181R. 1-2; PSI at 2. Each of the purchases were made at
defendant's Moab residence, which was located within a drug-free zone. 181R. 1-2; 182R.
2-3; 183R. 2-3; PSI at 2.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court's imposition of consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen years for
three counts of distribution of a controlled substance was reasonable and within the court's
broad discretion. Even with the imposition of consecutive prison terms, defendant still faced
a minimum prison sentence of only three years—two years less than had he been sentenced
for even one first degree felony, for which there was ample evidence. Moreover, the
sentencing judge duly considered the gravity and circumstances of the offense, together with
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of defendant, as required by statute. In light
of those factors, the court's sentence was reasonable and within its broad discretion. In short,
it cannot be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS
FOR DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
Subject to the limits prescribed by law, sentencing "rests entirely within the discretion

•"of the [trial] court." State v. Peterson, 6S1 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984). Where a defendant
4

has been found guilty of multiple felony offenses, the trial court may impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). The trial court may impose
consecutive sentences for multiple crimes even if the offenses were committed in the course
of a single criminal episode. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(5). In determining whether or not
to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must "consider the gravity and circumstances
of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1998).
Although the courts have opined that Utah's sentencing statute favors concurrent
sentencing, see State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297,1301 (Utah 1993),3 an appellate court will not
overturn a trial court's sentencing decision unless it is clear that the trial court abused its
discretion. See Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887; Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651. As the supreme court
in Gerrard observed, "[t]o do otherwise would have a chilling effect on the trial court which
has the main responsibility for sentencing." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. An abuse of
discretion may be found if the trial court fails to consider the statutory factors or if the
sentencing is otherwise inherently unfair or clearly excessive. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651.
However, an "appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887;
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651.

3

In so observing, the supreme court in Strunk cited Section 76-3-401(1) which
provides: "Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the court states in the
sentence that they shall run consecutively." Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301.
5

A review of the record in this case reveals that the court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing defendant to consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen years on each of the
three counts to which he pleaded guilty. The consecutive terms were reasonable not only in
light of the statutory factors, but also in light of the sentence that defendant otherwise would
have served had he been convicted on the first degree felonies.
A.

The Trial Court's Sentence Imposing Consecutive Prison Terms of
One-to-Fifteen Years for Distribution of a Controlled Substance Was
Reasonable.

Defendant was originally charged with three counts of distribution of a controlled
substance in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony. 18IR. 4; 182R. 1; 183R. 1. As such, he
faced indeterminate sentences of five years to life on each count. Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(4)(Supp. 1998); § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1998). However, pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant
pled guilty to three reduced charges of distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree
felony. 181R. 20-27. Accordingly, rather than facing a sentence of up to fifteen years to life
if convicted on the first degree felonies, defendant received a sentence that was the
equivalent of three to forty-five years in prison. 181R. 36-38. Even //defendant had
received concurrent prison terms on the first degree felonies or had been convicted of only
one first degree felony, he still would have faced a prison term of five years to life.
Considering the heavy sentences defendant was facing if convicted as charged, it
cannot be said "that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. Defendant admitted to selling the methamphetamine in each case.
18 IR. 21. Although defendant pled to reduced charges, that he sold the methamphetamine
6

within a drug-free zone was never in dispute. See 181R. 33 (Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Concurrent Sentences) ("Although he was arrested for distributing in a school
zone, as that is where his home was located, . . . ."). In light of this fact, imposition of
consecutive terms, resulting in a minimum prison term of only three years—two years less
than what he would have served had he been convicted ofjust one first degree felony—was
reasonable and within the discretion of the court. See State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118
(Utah 1985) (observing that facts relating to dismissed charges are properly considered at
sentencing); see also State v. Hines, 663 So.2d 199, 202 (La. App. 1996) (observing that a
trial court may consider a plea bargain when imposing sentence).
B.

The Trial Courts Properly Considered AH Legally Relevant Factors
in Sentencing.

As noted above, section 76-3-401(4) requires the court to "consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant." Failure to consider these factors can result in an abuse of discretion. Schweitzer,
943 P.2d at 651. However, the statute requires only that the court consider these factors, not
that it give them equal weight. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4); see also State v. Howell,
707 P.2d 115,118 (Utah 1985) ("Although a sentencing judge will give considerable weight
to the circumstances of the crime, a judge may also consider other factors."); State v. Nutall,
861 P.2d 454,458 (Utah App. 1993) ("the trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing
more emphasis on punishing defendant rather than rehabilitating him"). As such, "the
exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court,"

7

which endeavors to impose "a proper sentence based on the facts and law before it."
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887.
Contrary to defendant's claim, the record in this case reveals that the trial court duly
considered all statutory factors and acted within its discretion in imposing the sentence. The
parties did not request the preparation of a PSI. 181R. 34. However, after the prosecution
requested consecutive sentences, the trial court, on its own motion, ordered the preparation
of a presentence report. Docket Minute Entry, December 23, 1998.4 The PSI not only
provided information regarding the gravity and circumstances of the offense, but also
regarding defendant's history, character, and rehabilitative needs. After considering the
information in the report, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences.
1.

The Trial Court Properly Considered the Gravity and
Circumstances of the Offense.

As set forth in the Statements of Probable Cause and in the PSI, defendant sold
methamphetamine to confidential informants on three separate occasions within a five-day
period. 181R. 1-2; 182R. 2-3; 183R. 2-3; PSI at 2. As noted above, each sale occurred at
a residence located within a drug-free zone, a fact which subjected defendant to first degree
felony charges carrying a prison term of five years to life. Id.
Defendant has characterized the offense as "victimless." Aplt. Brf. at 15. Such a
conclusion, however, ignores the tremendous detrimental impact of drug abuse. While those
who purchase methamphetamine may be "willing" victims, they are nevertheless "harmed"
4

The docket, which is found in the files in the record, was not given a page
number.
.""•

8'

when they purchase and use the drug.5 Methamphetamine, which defendant admitted selling,
181R. 21, is a Schedule II controlled substance under both state and federal law. Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(B) (Supp. 1998); 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(c) (1981).6 Schedule II drugs
have a "high potential for abuse/9 which "may lead to severe psychological or physical
dependence." 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(b)(2). Moreover, the United States Congress has
concluded that the illegal distribution and improper use of these and other controlled
substances "have a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare" of
the public. Id. at § 801(2). In a real sense, therefore, the sale of methamphetamine is
anything but a "victimless" crime.
2.

The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's History.

Defendant objects, as an "obvious display of bias," to the PSI's comment that he had
"been arrested and charged with offenses which include violence, possession of a weapon,
and assault with a weapon, indicating a propensity for violent behavior, even though
prosecution has been declined on some of the offenses.'" Aplt. Brf. at 13 (quoting PSI at
10). Contrary to defendant's assertion, the PSI accurately reported his criminal record. The
PSI referenced three "violent" offenses, and indicated that "some" did not result in
5

A victim has been defined as "[o]ne harmed by or made to suffer from an act."
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 1286 (1988).
6

The schedules in the Utah Controlled Substances Act are nearly identical to the
schedules in the federal Controlled Substances Act. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4
with 21 U.S.C.A. 812; see also State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 914 n. 4 (Utah App. 1990)
(noting that the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-1 to -21
(Supp. 1998), incorporates the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801 to
904(1981)).
9

prosecution. Accordingly the trial court could only conclude that defendant was convicted
of only one such offense. The PSI specifically set forth the dispositions of these offenses in
the section listing defendant's adult record. PSI at 5. Although he was not convicted of the
weapons-related offenses, defendant was convicted of domestic violence assault. PSI at 5.
Defendant emphasizes that "he is not a threat to society" because he has never been
prosecuted for any other crimes of violence or that involve a weapon. Aplt. Brf. at 13 n. 1
(emphasis in original). Such a claim denies the course of his life. In addition to the domestic
violence conviction, and as discussed infra, at 11-12, defendant has been convicted of
burglary of a dwelling, two DUI-related offenses, and several thefts. Having now also added
to his criminal record three convictions for distribution of a controlled substance, defendant
does, in fact, represent a threat to society.
Even had the contract investigator improperly concluded that defendant's arrest record
demonstrated a propensity for violence, the record reveals that the trial court did not rely on
these unprosecuted arrests in imposing sentence. The court gave the following reasons for
its decision to impose consecutive prison terms:
The reason I'm ordering consecutive sentences, rather than concurrent
sentences, which are usually presumed, is that the Defendant has been
sentenced to prison on three previous occasions and, apparently, either served
out his time or persuaded authorities that he would not resume criminal
activity once he was released from prison and, yet, the evidence is that each
time he has resumed criminal activity. And so, it's pretty clear that with Mr.
Laxton, we're in a situation where we just have to keep him in prison as long
as we can. . . . I think it's important to state, with respect to this Defendant,
who's going back to prison now for the fourth time, that we want them to keep
him there, at least give him a priority for keeping him in there.

10

According to the matrix, even with this, he will spend four and a half
years in prison with this sentence, and that is not too much, given his history.
TOS at 8. Accordingly, the trial court relied not on defendant's arrest record, but on his
conviction record and his consistent return to criminal behavior notwithstanding several stays
in the Utah State Prison. Therefore, defendant's "view that the trial judge was unduly
influenced by [his] arrest record is purely speculative," State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d 984,986
(Utah 1986), especially in light of defendant's conviction record and the fact that he is likely
to serve AVi years based on the matrix. TOS at 8.
The PSI revealed a lengthy criminal history. Defendant reported that he had "some"
juvenile offenses. PSI at 4. Apparently having not learned from his experience in the
juvenile system, defendant entered the adult criminal system almost immediately after
attaining his majority. He was convicted of misdemeanor theft and driving under the
influence at the age of 18.7 PSI at 4. Less than two months after completing probation,
defendant pled guilty to felony theft. Id. His prison sentence of zero-to-five years was
suspended and he was placed on probation for three years. Id. However, less than eight
months later, defendant was convicted often counts of forgery and sentenced to zero-to-five
years in the Utah State Prison. Id. After serving almost one year in prison, defendant was
released on parole. Id. at 6. Just over one year later, defendant was again convicted of
felony theft and receiving stolen property and was sentenced to prison terms of zero-to-five

defendant's date of birth is April 13, 1962. PSI at 1.
11

years each.8 Id. at 4. Thereafter, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") revoked
defendant's parole on the forgery counts. Id. at 6. Defendant served another year and a half
in prison before the Board again released him on parole. Id. Defendant was able to stay out
of prison for almost two years. However, in 1988, defendant was convicted of burglary of
a dwelling, a third degree felony, and theft, a second degree felony. Id. at 5. He was
sentenced to a prison term of zero-to-five years on the burglary charge and one-to-fifteen
years on the theft charge. Id. His parole was subsequently revoked and he served almost
three more years in prison before being released on parole in 1991. Id. at 6. After being
released on parole in 1991, defendant was free from the criminal system for three years and
his sentence was successfully terminated in 1994. Id. The following year, however,
defendant was convicted of alcohol-related reckless driving and sentenced to 20 days in jail.
Id. at 5. In 1997, defendant was convicted of domestic violence. Id.
Citing State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), defendant also claims on appeal that
the contract investigator who prepared the PSI improperly considered every arrest, whether
or not prosecuted, and that the court erroneously relied on that arrest record in imposing
sentence.9 Aplt. Brf. at 13. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the PSI did not mislead the
8

It is not evident from the record whether the prison terms were consecutive or
concurrent.
9

Defendant claims that the investigator misconstrued the arrest record, in large part
due to his alleged bias against defendant due to the fact he was a jailor where defendant
had been in jail. Aplt. Brf. at 7, 13. Although defendant alleged the investigator's bias at
sentencing, the only facts in the presentence report which he questioned concerned the
February 20, 1981 record reflecting five charges. TOS at 3. The PSI indicated the
following: the State declined to prosecute one count of burglary charge and one count of
12

court regarding defendant's criminal record. The PSI disclosed arrests for thirty-two
different crimes, six of which resulted in felony convictions and four of which resulted in
misdemeanor convictions. PSI at 9. The PSI specifically advised the court that "[t]here have
been 22 crimes, including [fjelonies and [misdemeanors which have not been prosecuted
for various reasons." PSI at 9. Defendant's criminal history is, in any event, much worse
than that of the defendant in Galli, where the defendant's criminal history consisted of only
minor traffic offenses and a misdemeanor theft conviction. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938.
In any event, the supreme court has implied that because a trial court has broad
discretion in sentencing, it can consider the arrest record of the defendant. See State v.
McKenna, 728 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah 1986). One jurisdiction has held that "[although an
arrest record is not evidence of prior criminal history, '[tjhis information is relevant to the
court's assessment of the defendant's character and the risk that he will commit another
crime and is therefore properly considered by a court in determining sentence.'" Miller v.
State, 709 N.E.2d 48, 49 (Ind. App. 1999) (citations omitted).
3.

The Trial Court Properly Considered Defendant's Character.

In addition to defendant's criminal record, the PSI also revealed an extensive history
of substance abuse. Defendant began drinking at the age of 15. PSI at 7. Defendant was
theft; a second burglary charge was dismissed; defendant received one year probation on
a misdemeanor theft charge; and defendant was sentenced to 180 days in jail and fined
$200 for driving under the influence. PSI at 4. Defendant's only comment regarding this
record was that he did not remember "[djecline to prosecute, one year probation"
occurring. TOS at 3. However, he acknowledged that because it occurred 15 years ago,
he may simply not have remembered the incident. Id. Having failed to demonstrate any
bias or error, defendant's claim of bias is without merit.
13

reportedly under the influence of alcohol when he committed the burglary and theft in 1988.
Id. Defendant reported having an alcohol abuse problem until his three-year incarceration
from 1988 to 1991.10 Id. Although defendant's criminal record revealed only one early
arrest for a drug-related crime (which was subsequently dismissed), the PSI revealed a much
more extensive drug problem. Id. at 4, 8. Defendant started smoking marijuana at the age
of 16 and progressed to harder drugs (methamphetamine) at the age of 18. Id. at 8. Although
defendant denied abusing drugs at the present, he admitted to using methamphetamine on a
weekly basis.

Id.

Additionally, even though defendant claimed he only used

methamphetamine, he admitted that he sold drugs to obtain other drugs. Id. In short,
defendant has abused alcohol and drugs for twenty years.
Aside from defendant's substance abuse history, the PSI provided additional
information regarding defendant's character. The PSI revealed that defendant dropped out
of high school in the tenth grade in part because he was involved in drugs. Id. at 7.
Although defendant was unable to provide a complete account of his employment history,
he reported a very unstable employment record in the past year, holdingfivejobs in just over
a year. Id. at 8. He was fired from his last reported job after six months for violating
company rules. Id. In 1996, the Division of Family Services removed from his home and
placed for adoption his natural born child and a step-child. Id. at 6. Defendant points out in
his brief that he has expressed a desire to obtain his GED in the future. Aplt. Brf. at 15; PSI

Defendant denied drinking alcohol since his marriage in 1995. PSI at 7.
14

at 7. However, while expressing the desire to obtain his GED, the PSI indicates that
defendant "has no immediate plans do so." PSI at 7.
Defendant also argues that unlike the defendant in Galli, he did not flee from justice.
Aplt. Brf. at 15. This fact, however, can hardly be counted as a credit to defendant's
character inasmuch as he remained in the custody of the State since his arrest.11 Defendant
never had Galli's opportunity to flee from justice.12 Moreover, the sentence in Galli was
much harsher than defendant's sentence. Galli was sentenced to three consecutive terms of
five years to life, resulting in a minimum term of fifteen years. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. In
this case, defendant's sentence only results in a minimum term of three years. Accordingly,
absent mitigating circumstances which may justify an even earlier release, see infra, at 16,
the Board has the "unfettered discretion" to release defendant after only three years of
incarceration. Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991).

u

Defendant was arrested on October 21, 1998 with bail set at $20,000. 181R. 5-7.
The minute entry in the docket indicates that on November 4, 1998, the court denied
defendant's request that he be released on his own recognizance and ordered that bail
remain at $20,000. Docket Minute Entry, November 4, 1998. Nothing in the record
indicates that defendant ever posted bail and the trial court recommended at sentencing
that defendant "receive credit for all the time he's been in jail awaiting
senteneing-awaiting disposition." TOS at 9.
12

The State does not suggest that defendant necessarily would have absconded
from justice had he been released on bail or on his own recognizance. However, because
he was incarcerated pending disposition, the fact that he did not abscond cannot be
credited to his character.
15

4.

The Trial Court
Rehabilitative Needs.

Properly

Considered

Defendant's

Defendant contends that the PSI did not properly consider his rehabilitative needs.
Aplt. Brf. at 16. Yet, a review of the PSI reveals otherwise:
The defendant's need for substance abuse treatment will not be
negatively effected by the imposition of a consecutive sentence. Substance
abuse treatment and counseling are available in the prison system and the
defendant's progress in these programs and his future treatment needs will be
considered by the Board of Pardons and Parole. The defendant may also
benefit from vocational and education programs offered in a more structured
environment.
PSI at 10. Defendant asserts, without any support, that the "prison does not have the same
type of programs and substance abuse treatment available on the outside." Aplt. Brf. at 17.
Whether or not the assertion is accurate, there is no dispute that the prison is equipped for
treating inmates with substance abuse problems and there is nothing in the record to suggest
that the prison programs are less effective than those offered outside the prison. Indeed, the
prison treatment programs may very well be more effective, since treatment in prison takes
place in a highly controlled environment where access to alcohol or drugs is presumably
much more difficult. As defendant himself reported, he would like to participate in substance
abuse counseling "just so [he] can stay away from it." PSI at 8. The prison will offer such
an opportunity.
Defendant suggests that under Strunk, the imposition of consecutive prison terms
deprives the Board of its discretion to release him early if his progress in rehabilitation so
warrants. Aplt. Brf. at 15. In Strunk, however, the court sentenced the defendant to life
16

imprisonment for first degree murder and consecutive minimum mandatory terms of fifteen
years to life for child kidnapping and nine years to life for aggravated sexual abuse of a child.
Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1298. The supreme court vacated the consecutive sentences which would
have resulted in the defendant's incarceration for no less than 24 years. Id. at 1301-02.
Unlike the case in Strunk, defendant in this case was sentenced to indeterminate prison terms.
Under section 77-27-9( 1 )(b), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1998), the Board may release defendant
even before the minimum term has been served if mitigating circumstances justify the
release. Accordingly, notwithstanding the imposition of consecutive sentences, the Board
still has the discretion to parole defendant sooner than three years if defendant's progress so
warrants.13
Even if the sentence resulted in a minimum mandatory term of three years, which it
does not, the factors the supreme court found compelling in Strunk are not present here. The
court in Strunk concluded that the trial court had failed to sufficiently consider the absence
of prior violent crimes and the "extreme youth" of the defendant, who was at the time of the
offense sixteen years of age. Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1300, 1302. The 24-year minimum
mandatory sentence was the equivalent of one and one-half lifetimes of the defendant at that
I3

The supreme court in Galli vacated a sentence requiring the defendant to serve
three consecutive, indeterminate prison terms of five years to life. 967 P.2d at 938. The
decision was based in part on the conclusion that concurrent sentences would "allow[] the
Board of Pardons and Parole to release [Galli] from prison after five years if he has
shown genuine progress toward rehabilitation." Id. This conclusion, however, was based
on the false premise that a consecutive, indeterminate sentence would foreclose the Board
from granting an early release. Id. Yet, section 77-29-9 provides the Board with the
flexibility to parole a defendant before he serves the minimum term of an indeterminate
sentence if mitigating circumstances justify the early release.
17

time. In contrast, defendant, who was 36 years old at the time of the offense and who has
been in and out of prison most of his adult life, would be incarcerated for three years or onetwelfth of his lifetime.14
Defendant acknowledges that his rehabilitative needs were specifically addressed by
his attorney at sentencing. Aplt. Brf. at 16-17 & n. 3. However, he challenges the sentence
because the court did not discuss those needs when it pronounced the sentence. Aplt. Brf.
at 16-17. The statute only requires the court to consider the statutory factors, not that it
discuss them at sentencing. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). That the court considered
these factors is evident from the fact that it was the court, not counsel for defendant, who
deemed it necessary to order a PSI before imposing sentence. Docket Minute Entry,
December 23, 1998. Defendant has not pointed to any evidence indicating that the court
failed to read the report or consider the relevant factors. Defendant simply argues that the
Court should give greater weight to certain factors. If the Court were to do so, however, it
would merely be substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. Such is not the duty of
this Court.
In short, the court duly considered each of the statutory factors, and, in light of those
factors, imposition of consecutive prison terms was reasonable and within the broad
discretion of the trial court.

14

Obviously, the gravity and circumstances of the offense in Strunk, which
involved the brutal murder of a six-year old girl, were more compelling than those in this
case. 846 P.2d at 1299-1300. However, the court in Strunk focused on defendant's
young age and lack of criminal history, factors not present here.
18

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm
the trial court's sentence ordering defendant to serve consecutive prison terms of one-tofifteen years on each of the three offenses to which defendant pleaded.
Respectfully submitted this ZJ

day of August, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

JEFFREY S. GRAY
s/
(^ASSISTANT ATTORNBYGENERAL
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah
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Addendum A

Addendum A

PRIVATE
STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
Region VI,, Moab
1165 South Highway 191, Suite 3
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (435) 259-3790

PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
Date Due: 01/15/99
Sentencing Date: 01/20/99

JUDGE LYLE R. ANDERSON
MOAB
(CITY)

WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN

NAME: Kelly Mark Laxton
ALIASES: Kelly Mack Laxton
ADDRESS: 589 Locust Lane
Moab, Utah 84532
BIRTHDATE: 04/13/62 AGE: 36
BIRTHPLACE: Moab, Utah
LEGAL RESIDENCE: Utah
MARITAL STATUS: Divorced
INTERPRETER NEEDED: No

SEVENTH DISTRICT
GRAND
(COUNTY)

COURT

UTAH

CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR

COURT CASE NOS: 981700181, 182, & 183
OBSCISNO: 00005129
CO-DEFENDANTS: None
OFFENSE: Dist/Offer/Arr. To Distribute
Controlled Substance, 2nd Degree Felony
PLEA: Guilty DATE: 12/16/98
PROS. ATTORNEY: William L. Benge
DEF. ATTORNEY: Happy Morgan

PLEA BARGATN: On October 19,1998, the Grand County Attorney's Office filed three different
Criminal Informations against the defendant in the Seventh District Court in and for Grand County,
State of Utah. Information No. 9817-181 was filed for one count of Distribution of a Controlled
Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a First Degree Felony. Information No. 9817-182 was filed for one
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PLEA BARGATN: (Continued) count of Distribution of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free
Zone, a First Degree Felony. Information No. 9817-183 was filed for one count of Distribution of
a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a First Degree Felony. As a result of plea negotiations,
the defendant entered a guilty plea to three counts of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, Second
Degree Felonies.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Grand County Attorney's Office, Seventh District Court.
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: The are three separate cases involved in this matter. Each
case will be detailed for review.
Case No- SF98-57: Moab Police Det. Sgt. Mallon was contacted on August 24,1998 at 1240 hours
by a Confidential Informant and advised that arrangements had been made to buy Methamphetamine
from the defendant, Kelly Laxton. At 1540 hours the same date, a controlled buy supervised by Sgt.
Mallon took place. The defendant, Kelly Laxton, sold a purported .50 grams of Methamphetamine
to the C.I. for $40. The sale of the drugs took place at the Laxton residence, 589 Bowen Circle. A
warrant was obtained and the defendant was arrested on October 21, 1998 for Distribution of a
Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a First Degree Felony and booked into the Grand County
Jail.
Case # SF98-60: Moab Police Det. Sgt. Scott Mallon was contacted on August 26, 1998 at 1330
hours by Confidential Informants from the Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force and advised that
arrangements had been made to buy Methamphetamine from the defendant, Kelly Laxton. At 1554
hours that same day, Kelly Laxton sold a purported .50 grams of Methamphetamine for $50 to the
CI. at 589 Bowen Circle, the Laxton residence. The controlled buy was supervised by Sgt. Mallon.
A warrant was obtained for Distribution of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a First
Degree Felony, and the defendant was arrested and booked into the Grand County Jail on October
21, 1998.
Case # SF98-62: Moab Police Det. Sgt. Mallon was contacted at 1455 hours on August 28, 1998
by a Confidential Informant and informed that an arrangement had been made to buy
Methamphetamine from the defendant, Kelly Laxton. Mr. Laxton sold a purported 1.75 grams of
Methamphetamine for $120 to Confidential Informants from the Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force.
The sale of the drugs occurred at the Laxton residence located at 589 Bowen Circle. The controlled
buy was supervised by Sgt. Scott Mallon. A warrant was obtained for Distribution of a Controlled
Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a First Degree Felony, and the defendant was subsequently arrested
and booked into the Grand County Jail on October 21,1998.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Moab City Police CaseNo.s SF98-57, SF98- 60, SF98-62, Grand
County Attorney's Office, Seventh District Court.
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DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE: Mr. Laxton provided the following handwritten,
signed version of the offense, which is typed verbatim:
Oct 21 the police broke down the door at my moms house @ 6:30 am.
/s/ Kelly Laxton.

Date: 1/6/99

SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.

CO-DEFENDANT STATUS. There are no co-defendants in this case.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Grand County Attorney's Office, Seventh District Court.

VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT: There are no victims in this case.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Grand County Attorney's Office, Seventh District Court.
RESTITJIIIQN: Restitution in this case has been requested by the Grand/San Juan Drug Task
Force for reimbursement of expenses incurred for the purchase of the controlled substances and
payment of the Confidential Informants for their services.
COURT CASE #

COUNT #

VICTIM

AMOUNT

9817-181

1

Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force

$170.00

9817-182

2

Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force

90.00

9817-183

3

Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force

100.00

Total

$360.00

SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Moab Police Department Case No.s SF98-57, SF98-60, and
SF98-62.

CUSTODY STATUS: The defendant remains in custody at the Grand County Jail awaiting
sentencing on these matters.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Grand County Jail.
LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT:
enforcement concerning this case.

This agency did not request input from law

SOURCE OF INFORMATION : Department of Corrections files.
JUVENILE RECORD: The defendant stated he has some juvenile offenses in his past, however
he can not remember the dates. The defendant stated to this investigator he had been sent to the
Boy's Ranch in Mapleton, Utah and the State School in Ogden, Utah, as a result ofjuvenile offenses.
There were no records obtained to confirm any juvenile offenses.

ADULT RECORD:
DATE

AGENCY

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

11/20/80

Moab PD

Poss. Stolen Property

Decline to Prosecute

02/20/81

Moab PD

Burglary
Burglary
Theft, Class B
Theft
DUI

Decline to Prosecute
Dismissed
1 Year Probation
Decline to Prosecute
180 Days; $200 Fine

10/18/81

Utah Hwy Patrol

Poss. Controlled Sub.

Dismissed

04/12/82

MoabPD

Theft

Guilty Sentenced USP 0-5
3 Years Probation

12/01/82

Moab PD

Forgery (10 Counts)
Forgery (2 Counts)

0-5 Utah State Prison
Dismissed

12/06/84

Moab PD

Felony Theft
Rec. Stolen Property

0-5 Utah Sate Prison
0-5 Utah State Prison

10/09/86

MoabPD

Misd. Theft

Dismissed
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DATE

AGENCY

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

10/21/86

Moab PD

Burglary (12 Counts)
Theft (12 Counts)

Dismissed (11 Counts)
Dismissed (8 Counts)

10/22/86

Moab PD

Theft, Class A

Dismissed

05/12/87

Moab PD

Burglary
Attempted Rape

Dismissed
Dismissed

06/12/87

So S. L. PD

Attempted Theft

Dismissed

12/31/87

Moab PD

Felon in Poss. of Firearm

Dismissed

01/19/88

Moab PD

Misd. Theft

Dismissed

03/29/88

Moab PD

Burglary of Vehicle
Theft

Dismissed
Dismissed

04/26/88

Moab PD

Burglary of a Dwelling
Theft, 2nd Degree Felony

0-5 Utah State Prison
1-15 Utah State Prison

04/26/94

Cortez, Colo PD

Fugitive From Justice

Extradite to Utah

02/18/95

Grand Co. SO

DUI

Reduce to Alcohol Reckless
20 Days, $500 Fine

07/26/96

Grand Co. SO

Peace Bond

No Info. Available

09/12/96

Grand Co. SO

Assault w/Weapon

Dismissed

07/02/97

Grand Co. SO

Simple Assault

Dismissed

11/18/97

Grand Co. SO

Assault/Domestic Violence

6 Months in Jail; $300 Fine

01/19/98

Grand Co. SO

Violation of Protective Order No Information Available

10/01/98

Moab,UtPD

Distribute Controlled Sub.

(3 Cases) 2nd Deg. Felony

PRESENT OFFENSE
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Utah Criminal History File No. 00194114; Colorado Criminal
History File No. 676739; FBI File no. 676325X5; Interstate Identification Index; Utah Statewide
Warrants; NCIC; Presentence Investigation Packet.

DRIVING HISTORY: Records indicate the defendant has a current Utah Commercial Driver's
License No. 148164881.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Utah Driver's License Query.

PENDING CASES: There appear to be no criminal cases pending against the defendant at this time.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION:

Seventh District Court

PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY: Records indicate the defendant was first placed on one year
probation on April 20,1981, which he successfully completed. The defendant was committed to the
Utah State Prison on December 20, 1982 and released on parole November 21, 1983. The parole
was revoked January 4,1985 and the defendant was again incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. He
was granted parole again on July 8, 1986, which was revoked on May 13, 1988 and the defendant
was again returned to the Utah State Prison. The defendant was granted parole a third time on April
23,1991 and his sentence was terminated successfully on May 11,1994. In summary, the defendant
has been granted the privilege of probation one time which he successfully completed. He has been
paroled from the Utah State Prison three different times, returning to prison for new offenses two
of those times and successfully completing the third parole on May 11,1994.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION. Department of Corrections Files.

BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: Kelly Mark Laxton is 36 years old,
the youngest child of Homer D. and Lynda H. Laxton, born in Moab, Utah. The defendant's
parents divorced when he was approximately three years of age. He was raised by his mother and
attended Grand County Schools, dropping out in the 10th grade because he was bored with school
and was involved with drugs. Kelly married Laura Cave on July 21, 1995 in Moab. They divorced
in November of 1997. One child was born to this union. The child, along with a step-child were
removed from the home and placed for adoption by the Division of Family Services in 1996. Mr.
Laxton has no contact with either his father or his daughter. The defendant has spent approximately
five years of his adult life confined in the Utah State Prison. He is a truck driver and mechanic by
trade and was living with his mother at the time he was arrested for the present offense.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.

MARITAL HISTORY: Kelly married Laura Cave on July 21,1995 and they divorced in November
of 1997. He is presently planning to marry Theresa Brune in January or February of 1999.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.

EDUCATION: The defendant attended Grand County Schools, dropping out in 10th grade because
he was involved with drugs and was bored with school. He completed a correspondence course and
received a certificate in diesel mechanics while incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. He would like
to obtain his GED in the future although he has no immediate plans to do so.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.

GANG AFFILIATIONS: The defendant denies any affiliation with gangs.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.
PHYSICAL HEALTH: The defendant describes his physical health as good. He was hospitalized
in 1995 where he underwent surgery to repair a broken jaw he received in a fight. He denies any
other health problems and is not taking any prescription medication.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.

MENTAL HEALTH: The defendant describes his mental health as good. He deals with stress by
playing cards and sleeping. He denies ever having been referred for psychological counseling and
denies any suicidal ideation. The defendant has never been on medication for psychological or
emotional problems and does not feel counseling would benefit him at the present time. The
defendant denies ever being the victim of any physical or sexual abuse.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.
ALCOHOL HISTORY: The defendant began drinking at age 15. He admits past abuse of alcohol,
drinking all types of alcohol heavily before his last incarceration in the Utah State Prison in 1988.
The defendant was under the influence of alcohol when he committed a burglary in 1988. The
defendant denies any alcohol use since his marriage in 1995.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.

DRUG HISTORY: The defendant started smoking marijuana at age 16. He progressed to harder
drugs at age 18, using only Methamphetamine and Marijuana. He describes his current use of
Methamphetamine as once a week and denies the use of any other drugs. The defendant admits
selling drugs to obtain other drugs. The defendant feels he has abused drugs in the past, especially
when his child was taken from his home, but denies abuse at the present time. The defendant would
like to participate in counseling for substance abuse "just so I can stay away from it." The defendant
admits that he was under the influence of drugs when he committed the present offenses, but denies
committing any other offenses while under the influence of drugs.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: The defendant provided an incomplete account of his employment
history. He has been employed only on spot jobs for the last year. He reports doing mechanic work
at his home to make money when he is not working elsewhere.
REASON
EMPLOYER
WAGE
TITLE
START/END
EQR LEAVING
Billy Hass

10% of Profit Truck Driver 4/98 to 10/98

Fired for Violation of
Company Rules.

J.C.Hunt

$.23/Mile

Truck Driver 7/98

One Trip Only

Warren Closterman

$500

Truck Driver 7/98

One Trip Only

L.W.Miller

Truck Driver 8/97 to 1/98

Lay Off

LeGrand Johnson

Truck Driver Summer 1997

Lay Off.

SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.
FINANCIAL SITUATION: The defendant reports no income since his arrest for the present
offense. Before that, his means of support was occasional mechanic work and spot driving jobs. He
was residing with his mother who provides his room and board. The defendant reports past due bills
to Allen Memorial Hospital in the amount of $340. He also reports owing the Division of Family
Services $7,000 in back child support. The defendant denies ever having anything repossessed or
filing bankruptcy and has no plans to do so. The defendant owns a 1977 Chevrolet pickup which
he values at $1,000 and denies ownership of any other real property or assets.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.

MILITARY RECORD: The defendant has never served in any branch of the Armed Forces.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Presentence Investigation Packet.

COLLATERAL CONTACTS: The defendant was asked to provide letters of character reference.
As of the writing of this report, no letters have been received. If any are received before the
submission of this report, they will be attached for the Court's review.

EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: Kelly Mark Laxton, 36 years old, is appearing before the Court for
sentencing on three cases of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, all Second Degree Felonies.
The charges resulted from the defendant selling Methamphetamine to Confidential Informants from
the Grand/San Juan Drug Task Force on three separate occasions. The Court asked for the
completion of the Presentence Investigation with emphasis placed on whether concurrent or
consecutive sentences should be imposed.
The defendant, through his counsel, makes a valid argument for concurrent rather than consecutive
sentences. The points supporting counsel's position have been noted, however the Office of Adult
Probation and Parole supports the imposition of consecutive sentences in this matter for the
following reasons.
The imposition of consecutive sentences does not take away from the wide latitude granted to the
Board of Pardons and Parole. The category of crimes the defendant has been charged with do not
require mandatory imprisonment for a specified length of time by statute. The recommendations
made by the Utah Sentencing Commission in the Adult Sentencing and Release Guidelines are
intended to be guidelines only and do not have any binding effect on the Board of Pardons and
Parole in considering the length of time a defendant must serve. The Board of Pardons and Parole
will still retain the authority to release the defendant from confinement when it deems appropriate,
even though a consecutive sentence has been imposed.
The statute requires the Court to consider the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant when considering whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. Mr. Laxton has
a lengthy criminal history. He has been arrested and charged with approximately 32 different crimes
since he turned 18 years of age. Of those 32 offenses, he has been convicted of 6 Felonies and 4
Misdemeanors. There have been 22 crimes, including Felonies and Misdemeanors which have not
been prosecuted for various reasons. The defendant has been incarcerated in the Utah State Prison
on three different occasions, spending approximately five and one-half years of his adult life in
prison. The defendant has been granted the privilege of probation early in his criminal career. He
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EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: (Continued) completed the first period of probation successfully
as a youth. While on probation the second time, the defendant committed a felony which resulted
in his being sent to the Utah State Prison. The defendant has been paroled from prison on three
different occasions. He has been convicted of new crimes and returned to the Utah State Prison while
on parole, two of those three times. It should be noted that the defendant has been arrested and
charged with offenses which include violence, possession of a weapon, and assault with a weapon,
indicating a propensity for violent behavior, even though prosecution has been declined on some of
the offenses.
The defendant admits the abuse of controlled substances and committed the present offenses to
support his use of them. The defendant's need for substance abuse treatment will not be negatively
effected by the imposition of a consecutive sentence. Substance abuse treatment and counseling are
available in the prison system and the defendant's progress in these programs and his future
treatment needs will be considered by the Board of Pardons and Parole. The defendant may also
benefit from vocational and education programs offered in a more structured environment.
The defendant's lengthy criminal history, continued involvement with the criminal justice system,
lack of the ability to obtain and successfully complete substance abuse treatment on his own, and
his lack of obtaining steady employment are all factors to be considered by the Court in this matter.
It is the opinion of Adult Probation and Parole that the defendant should receive consecutive
sentences to allow for a longer period of control of the defendant for the protection of society.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

I si William Christensen
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR
APPROVED,

/s/ Robert R. Valerio
ROBERT R. VALERIO, SUPERVISOR

Attachments:
Matrix

REECQMMENDATTON
It is respectfully recommended by the staff of Adult Probation and Parole that the defendant, Kelly
Mark Laxton, Court Case No.s 9817-181,9817-182, and 9817-183, be sentenced to the Utah State
Prison according to statute and that the sentences be ordered to run consecutively.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
/s/ William Chrisfensen
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN, CONTRACT INVESTIGATOR

APPROVED,

/s/Robert R.Valerio

ROBERT R. VALERIO, SUPERVISOR

Addendum B

Addendum B

ORIGINAL

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT - MOAB COURT
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEVENTH nioTPi^T r.m »RT

2

WirCiitSiU W w » : i i £

3
STATE OF UTAH,

™*>

4

Plaintiff,
5

CLERK OF THE COURT

BX-

VS.

FEB 19 19SS
Deputy

6
KELLY M. LAXTON,
7
Defendant,

Case N o ( s ) : 981700181 FS
981700182 FS
981700183 FS

8
9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 20th day of January, 1999,

11 the above-entitled matter came on for SENTENCING HEARING
12 before the HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON, sitting as Judge in
13 the above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and
14 that the following audiotape proceedings were had.
15
16
17
18

FILED

19
20

FEB 2 6 1999
21

COURT O F APPEALS

22

S E E cfVffto-cfl

23
24
25

ASSOCIATED
10 West Broadway

PROFESSIONAL

R E P O R T E R S , L. C.

Suite 200 . Salt Lake Cits-. Utah 84101 . ( 8 0 1 ) 322-5441 .Fax (801) 322-3445

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff:

WILLIAM L. BENGE, ESQ.
County Attorney - Grand County
76 South Main #20
Moab, Utah 84532

For the Defendant:

HAPPY MORGAN, ESQ.
Grand County Public Defender
8 South 100 East
Moab, Utah 84532

3
1 II

THE COURT: All right, we have Kelly Laxton's case

2

then, first on the criminal calendar.

3

and 183 and 181.

4

factual inaccuracies in the report, Ms. Morgan?

5

MS. MORGAN:

The case is 9817182

I have the pre-sentence report. Are there

There's only one that Mr. Laxton would

6

like to point out to the Court.

The arrest, or the notation

7

on his adult record, 2-20-81, there are five charges there.

8

It says, "Decline to prosecute, one year probation." Mr.

9

Laxton does not remember that occurring.

It was more than

10

15 years ago, and so, it is possible that he doesn't

11

remember—he suggested that to me—but he doesn't believe

12

that that—those instances occurred.

13

THE COURT:

14 Y o u
15

on

Okay.

I've heard quite a bit from both of

the recommendation, but I'll give you each a change

to address the recommendation again.

16

MS. MORGAN: Urn—

17

THE COURT:

I've heard your own recommendations; of

18

course, you've just now seen the recommendation from the

19

investigator.

20

MS. MORGAN:

Well, Your Honor, I did submit a motion to

21

the Court regarding Mr. Laxton's sentencing and the

22

appropriateness of consecutive rather than concurrent terms,

23 based on his plea agreement, and I still feel—we came back
24

the last time and the Court sent this over to adult

25 probation and parole, and I just don't feel that this report

I

4

1

addresses all the considerations that are in the statute.

2

It does address his criminal history, but it doesn't really

3

go to the gravity of the circumstances of these particular

4

instances—Mr. Laxton's character, in general.

5

really feel like you're paying enough attention to his

6

rehabilitative needs. And I'm concerned with the overall,

7

sort of, I don't know, view of the person who prepared this

8

report.

9

probation officer is also a jailer at the Monticello jail.

And I don't

As the Court has been made aware in the past, this

10 And though, you know, I'm certainly not one to, you know,
11

claim conspiracy theories in Court, I'm just concerned that

12

a jailer isn't an appropriate person to be judging someone

13

like Mr. Laxton.

14

It's our hope, when we get a report from adult

15 probation and parole, that we get someone who is somewhat in
16

the middle and—and not on the prosecution's side or on the

17

—and the jail's side, per se, of a set of circumstances

18

like this.

19

comes more from that side than from the middle, where we

And I think that this report shows someone who

20 would like to see a probation officer being.
21

He counts all of Kelly's 32 arrests, and he does note

22

that over 20 of those were dismissed or, for whatever

23

reason, not prosecuted, but he seems to work on the premise

24 that, well, he was probably guilty of those things anyway.
25 And it seems like he's been placed in the highest matrix

5
1 because of his arrest record, but yet, in the evaluation
2

summary, he's giving no credit for the fact that 22 of those

3 have been dismissed.

In fact, it suggests that we need to

4 be careful about Mr. Laxton being out in society because he
5 had all of these, suggesting that those 22, perhaps he got
6 away scot-free, but he actually did them.
7

And so, I'm just concerned that—that this evaluator

8 hasn't been unbiased and that he brought his own personal
9 opinions, as a jailer, in making this report, and that
10 Mr. Laxton hasn't had a fair opportunity to have all the
11

things that the statute points out should be considered,

12

considered by this report.

13

So, I'm asking the Court sentence him to just one term,

14 or that the terms run concurrently rather than
15

consecutively.

It gives the prison the appropriate amount

16 of time to determine what he needs, in terms of
17

rehabilitation.

18

for a year, and they can keep him there for 15 years, if

19

they decide that that's what they need to do.

20

Certainly, they'll have him, at a minimum,

The prison does not have the programs and the substance

21

abuse treatment that Mr. Laxton could get on the outside.

22

If he puts in a year and his behavior is excellent, I would

23

like him to have the opportunity to go to a halfway house,

24 or drug treatment program, if that's appropriate.
25

But if

the Court follows the recommendations of adult probation and

6
1 parole, that won't be possible, and I just don't think that
2 that's fair in this case.
THE COURT: Mr. Laxton, do have anything you'd like to

3

4 add to what your attorney has said, or anything you'd like
5 to say?
MR. LAXTON:

6

Well, just on the—Mr. Christensen did do

7 a report and stuff.

He was the jailer down there, when I

v
8 was in jail down there in 91, before I got released from

9 prison the last time, and he does know me.
THE COURT:

10

Oh, so you

that, as a—under the contract

11 of the State, you were in the State Prison, but serving in
12 Monticello?
13

MR. LAXTON: Yes.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. LAXTON: Uh-huh.

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

MS. MORGAN:

~Kay.

So he knows you?

And this is the first time that Mr. Laxton

18 has made me aware of that fact, but I would certainly argue
that that adds into my concern that this jailer has a

19

20 predisposed notion about this gentleman, and that is shown
in his recommendations here.

21
22

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Benge?

23

MR. BENGE:

Your Honor, just briefly, I—I guess Ms.

24 Morgan's arguments that a person who happens to have another
25 position as a jailer, in a different county, should not be

I

7
1 || able to perform a pre-sentence report, because he'd be
2 || biased on behalf of law enforcement.

This doesn't fall o n —

3 I on my ears very well.
4||

I guess, under the same theory, probation officers, who

5 || are sworn police officers, who carry a badge and carry a
6 || <jun, should also not be able to prepare probation reports,
7

"cause they would be sympathetic to law enforcement, also.

8

So, therefore, maybe we ought to ship all of our pre-

9

sentence report to the social services, or some—some other

10

agency that would be more warm and fuzzy, but that's n o t —

11 that's not the way the law is.
12
13

Your Honor, there's nothing substantive that would show
that the person who prepared this report has any bias.

Your

14 Honor, based on Mr. Laxton's past history—and I have
15 personal knowledge of most of that myself, so I guess—I
16

guess I'm prejudice, too.

But, quite frankly, I don't want

17 to see Mr. Laxton out in a halfway house in a year, and I
18

certainly don't want to see him back in Moab in a—in a

19

short period of time.

20

Mr. Laxton's been a menace on this community, he's been

21

selling drugs within 200 feet of a school, and I think he

22

should be sentenced consecutively.

I'll submit it on that

23 basis.
24

THE COURT:

25 not be imposed?

Any legal reason why the sentence should

8
1 ||

MS. MORGAN:

2 II

THE COURT:

None, Your Honor.
It's the judgment sentence of this Court

3

that the Defendant be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison

4

for a term of not less than one, nor more than 15 years, on

5

each of these charges, and I order that the sentences be

6

served consecutively.

7

The reason I'm ordering consecutive sentences, rather

8

than concurrent sentences, which are usually presumed, is

9

that the Defendant has been sentenced to prison on three

10 J previous occasions and, apparently, either served out his
H

time or persuaded authorities that he would not resume

12

criminal activity once he was released from prison and, yet,

13

the evidence is that each time he has resumed criminal

14

activity.

And so, it's pretty clear that with Mr. Laxton,

15 we're in a situation where we just have to keep him in
16 prison as long as we can. And I know he's competing for
17 beds with other people who need to be imprisoned, because
18

they—they will commit crimes when they get out, but I think

19 | it's important to state, with respect to this Defendant,
20 who's going back to prison now for the fourth time, that we
21 want them to keep him there, at least give him a priority
22

f°r keeping him in there.

23

According to the matrix, even with this, he will spend

24

four and a half years in prison with this sentence, and that

25

is not too much, given his history.

I

9
So, that's the—let's see, I don't—were you asking for
any restitution in this case?
MR. BENGE:

I—

THE COURT:

I didn't see it in the recommendations, and

I don't remember you asking for it.
MR. BENGE:

(Inaudible).

THE COURT: All right.

He's remanded to the custody of

the sheriff to be transported to the Utah State Prison to
serve his sentence.

He'll receive credit for all the time

he's been in jail awaiting sentencing—awaiting disposition.
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